

"In My beginning IS my End."
- T.S. Eliot
Four Quartets

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American Values and Organized Crime: Suckers and Wiseguys

Peter A. Lupsha

Eliot's statements about time in the opening of *Four Quartets* are also statements about culture. Our symbols of self all contain our collective past in our individual present. And indeed, our individual and collective future is but a hall of mirrors reflecting past on present as we go forward. Culture brands our behavior so that most sensitive observers are both looking in and acting at the same time. Our cultural images of what we ought to be often define what we are and become. We are trained to think in stereotypes, standardized images that hide individual uniqueness.

To create a unique self is a difficult task, a luxury few have the wit or leisure even to attempt. Most of us are thus content to be molded by a role as defined by culture.¹ This process, however, is a subtle one. Patterns are drawn not only from sense data and technological reality, but also from a desire to be, as well as an understanding of what has worked in the past. Thus we are not only cultural creations at best, caricatures at worst; we are ongoing representations of myth as repeated and delimited by our society over time.

When we ask "What's American about American crime?" the answer is flashed for all of us (Americans) to see. If we say "violent urban street crime," a host of modern American cultural images appears. A different set appears if we say "Jesse James," and a third set if we say "organized crime." This paper concentrates on the third set of images. Organized crime provides a panoply of American images containing all of the relativity of Eliot, while bearing the unique imprint of our American culture.

The taproots of American culture are those Lockean values embodied in the writings, declarations, and documents of the Founding Fathers and their interpreters. These values are based in beliefs in individualism, property, or "materialism," competition, and freedom of action, or inde-

pendence. From the interplay of these values come our perceptions of opportunity, democratic procedural equality, substantive equality, material success, acquisitiveness, and a belief in right vested in the individual rather than in the community.² As these values and ideas shape our political and economic system, so too, they shaped the development and evolution of organized crime in America.

Organized criminal groups have operated in the United States from its very beginnings.³ Whenever there is an opportunity to enhance profit or create wealth, wherever there are imbalances in the market system or government has through its actions created scarcity and black markets, or wherever local culture and mores make for illicit actions or behaviors against which there are no universal taboos, enterprising individuals will take advantage of the opportunity, risking potential sanction in order to accrue windfall profits. Such fields of illicit action are limited only by culture, precedent, opportunity, and the swiftness and certainty of sanction. If large profits are easily available with relatively little risk, the potential for organized criminal entrepreneurship is enhanced. This point seems obvious enough, yet history and experience show that it has rarely been acted upon by designers of criminal justice systems, at least in the United States. The reason is not a failure of understanding; it is that such planning must operate within the cultural framework that allows the development of organized crime in the first place. Thus cultural and juridical treatment of symptoms, rather than causes, must be the rule; the opportunity for entrepreneurial and syndicated criminal enterprise remains.

America has always been a haven for the entrepreneurial endeavor of organized crime. John Hancock amassed his fortune financing smuggling operations that overcame the Crown's attempts at orderly regulation of West Indian commerce. Robert Morris and James Wilson, two of the important draftsmen of our Constitution, were, as a U.S. senator and associate justice of the Supreme Court respectively, involved with a number of prominent others in the famous Yazoo land fraud.

Land fraud and land speculation in America are older than our form of government. Such enterprise has been assisted, as Tocqueville noted, by the relative equality of condition in the United States, which "naturally urges men to embark on commercial and industrial pursuits, and . . . tends to increase and to distribute real property".⁴ Americans have always been willing to opt for personal gain against the possibility of sanction and condemnation. The line between sharp practice and criminal act has always been a blurred one.

James Truslow Adams, of the illustrious Adams family, put it this way:

Lawlessness has been and is one of the most distinctive American traits. . . . It is impossible to blame the situation on the "foreign-

ers." The overwhelming mass of them were law-abiding in their own lands. If they become lawless here it must be largely due to the American atmosphere and conditions. There seems to me to be plenty of evidence to prove that the immigrants were made lawless by America, rather than America made lawless by them. If the general attitude towards law, if the laws themselves and their administration, were all as sound here as in the native lands of the immigrants, those newcomers would give no more trouble here than they did at home. This is not the case, and Americans themselves are, and most always have been, less law-abiding than the more civilized European nations.⁵

In America *caveat emptor*, let the buyer beware, was a ruling principle of commerce until this generation of consumers began to seek to restrain it. Our values and predisposition for material gain have always made the "Murphy game," "the pigeon drop," "three card Monte," and other ancient con games and swindles commonplace. P. T. Barnum's admonition "There's a sucker born every minute" rings as true today as it did a hundred years ago, as recent commodity and diamond investment swindles indicate. Indeed it is useful to examine the use and operation of the concept of "sucker" in our history and thought. This concept is an ingrained part of our nation, one of the most American things about American crime. It states, in part, that an avaricious individual, or just a naive and easily deceived one, is fair game for those who are sharper, quicker witted, or more worldly. All, in America, are at liberty to be suckers or swindlers.

As there are suckers, so there are "sharpies." Americans have always been willing to engage in sharp, often illegal, practice if the opportunity presents itself. We are told that the political epitaph of Boss Plunkett of Tammany Hall was, "I seen my opportunities, and I took 'em!"—an epitaph that is often seen not as a motto of avaricious behavior, or a violation of public role and trust, but simply as an example of living off politics as well as for it. In engaging in "white graft," Plunkett, Tweed, and other political bosses were simply combining "good business" with politics.

Tycoons like Cornelius "Let the public be damned" Vanderbilt, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. "The Lord gave me my money" Rockefeller, whom Theodore Roosevelt referred to as the "malefactors of great wealth," were not dismayed by the political bosses as long as they were not losing their share of what was there to be gained.⁶ These captains of industry and politics were models for the street-gang immigrant kids who were to use the black market opportunity of Prohibition to accumulate capital and form the organizational connections that created modern organized crime in America.

Add to this the image of America as the land of opportunity, a land of

milk and honey, where the streets were paved with gold. In such an early paradise, where the good things of life were for the taking, one would seem a fool to work long hours for low pay and slow advancement. America was a land of opportunity; its values prevented swift or easy punishment of those who interpreted liberty as a license to steal. The arrival of Prohibition simply added the hypocrisy of law, and its corruption, to this ethic, and it gave a certain veneer of legitimacy to the entrepreneurship of the bootlegger and rising organized gangster. Flowing alongside this social, economic, and political flotsam in our cultural stream was our concept of the "sucker."

A second aspect to the sucker concept must be mentioned here. This is the notion that one is a sucker if one who is outside the dominant value system, or social strata, lives by the values of that dominant system. This aspect of the concept is important because, along with freedom of individual choice, it lies behind much of the development of organized crime in America. In 1930 Courtney Terret published a novel about organized crime entitled *Only Saps Work*.⁷ In the same period the celluloid mobsters of Hollywood—Edward G. Robinson, James Cagney, Humphrey Bogart—echoed this theme, as did the real-life gangster Charlie "Lucky" Luciano.

A "crumb," according to Luciano, was one "who works and saves, and lays his money aside; who indulges in no extravagance." Luciano wanted "money to spend, beautiful women to enjoy, silk underclothes and places to go in style."⁸

Luciano had no intention of being a "crumb" or "sucker" or of participating in the "grind" of ordinary existence any more than his associates did. Vincent Teresa, a nonmember associate of the Patriarca Italian-American La Cosa Nostra (LCN) organized crime family, more recently repeated this theme:

I knew that the only way I could live in the style I liked was by being a thief. It was easier than working for a living. The money rolled in. Sometimes it went out faster than I could steal it, but I liked the life. I liked the excitement. There was kind of a thrill to everything I did.

A close study of Teresa's life suggests that these images of ease and excitement were mostly mythic, but there was more to it than that. Teresa continues:

It's hard to explain, but there was a feeling of power being on the street with men that were always hustling, outfiguring the straights. It seemed that everyone I knew or grew up with was a thief of one kind or another. We were all living pretty good, spending high, dressing fine, hitting all the good spots. It was a helluva life.¹⁰

Now we have images of power, as well as excitement, in "conning" the modern version of the hard-working sucker. There is also the "high living" that Luciano referred to, as well as something else—the avoidance of a nine-to-five life at an ordinary job, the "grind." Teresa makes this explicit. He and an associate had opened a successful nightclub which Teresa wanted to burn down for the insurance money. His partner prevented him from doing so because the nightclub was making such a good profit. To Teresa, "The nightclub was making money, but it was strictly a grind, and who needs a grind when there is easy money to be made?"¹¹ Such statements by career professionals in syndicated crime tell us a lot, not only about crime in America but also about its roots in our cultural ideas about the "sucker."

Alongside the concept of the sucker, the willingness to engage in sharp practice, and visions of liberty and opportunity, stands the notion of material success. The organized criminal hungers for success while desperately seeking to avoid being a sucker. Wealth without work, however, is difficult to achieve. Thus the organized criminal seeks to place a veil of romance and myth over his activities to endow them with apparent ease and success so that he will not be thought of as society's fool.

The organized criminal must establish a code of conduct that permits success, or rationalizes success, without considering the successful criminal a "sucker." This is a paradox. If the "straight" world and work are the domain of suckers, then criminal actions—even failure, arrest, and imprisonment—must be endowed with ease, glamor, success, and correctness. This world view is accomplished in two ways, first, by the establishment of an internal personal code, a set of rules and ethics, which may seem perverse to the outside world, but which permits a sense of self-worth for the criminal, and second, by the establishment of an image of the outside world that considers suckers and straights as inherently corrupt, dishonest, and hypocritical. Paradoxically, this image suggests that the suckers lack the courage and grace to act on the insight that the world is a "con." They know that those with political and economic power get the good things of life, but because they are afraid, the suckers toil long and hard, accepting hardship, and deferring gratifications. Lucky Luciano summed it up like this:

Everybody's got larceny in 'em, only most of 'em don't have the guts to do nothin' about it. That's the big difference between us and the guys who call themselves honest. We got the guts to do what they'd like to do only they're too scared to.¹²

This cynicism toward the outside world, plus a personal code of incorruptibility and loyalty to kin, peers, and criminal cohorts, permits the organized criminal to invert the mirror of reality and view his values as correct and society's as perverse.

"To be straight is to be a victim." So states a common La Cosa Nostra "borgata" expression. As Donald Cressey tells us about this code,

A man who is committed to regular work and submission to duly constituted authority is a sucker. When one Cosa Nostra member intends to insult and cast aspersion on the competence of another, he is likely to say, sneeringly, "Why don't you go out and get a job?"¹³

To get a job requires education. During the first decade of this century, when young street hoodlums learned the habits and skills essential for success during Prohibition, education was just beginning to "emerge as an increasing important qualification for employment." But as Nelli notes:

To slum area youngsters like Salvatore Lucania (Charlie Lucky Luciano), John Torrio, and Alphonse Capone (Al Capone), excitement and economic opportunity seemed to be out in the streets rather than in the classroom. As soon as they reached the legal withdrawal age of fourteen, they left school.¹⁴

According to Luciano, he knew "that school had nothing to teach him," but in the streets he saw "some people had money, some people didn't."

When I looked around the neighborhood, I found out that the kids wasn't the only crooks. We were surrounded by crooks, and plenty of them was guys who were supposed to be legit, like the landlords and storekeepers and the politicians and cops on the beat. All of them was stealing from somebody.¹⁵

Here is a glimmer of that world view of society as corrupt emerging in the child, a view that was reinforced by Luciano's experiences in the Brooklyn Truancy School and Hampton Farms Penitentiary.¹⁶ It is this world view that sets the organized criminal apart from his fellow street-gang members.

Nelli notes:

Unlike most of their contemporaries, who also belonged to street gangs and were involved in occasional mischief-making, the criminals-in-the-making had little or nothing to do with legitimate labor, which they believed was only for "suckers," men who worked long hours for low pay and lived in overcrowded tenements with their families.¹⁷

The picture painted here is rather different from the "queer ladder thesis" of crime as a method of upward mobility, which has been stressed by some sociologists.¹⁸ Yes, some of these young immigrants chose ca-

reers in crime, but they did not act out of frustration, or any long struggle of being excluded from the political ladder, or because they were blocked from other avenues of career advancement. They turned to crime because they felt that the legitimate opportunity structures were for "suckers," and they were not going to be trapped in the nickel-and-dime world of ordinary work.

The young organized criminals of the Prohibition era saw themselves as the "wiseguys," a term still used in LCN circles to denote soldiers who appear to make an easy buck without working. These "wiseguys" could have economic mobility without ever climbing the status ladder. Their choice was an individual decision, reinforced by peers, experience, and a talent for violence. They were not more frustrated, nor more deprived (relatively or absolutely) than their classroom peers and fellow street-gang members who chose to be "straights" and suckers, following the legitimate socioeconomic ladder, narrow and crowded as it may have been.

To avoid becoming trapped as suckers in the grind of work and subervience to superiors, this alternative world view was created. As one was surrounded by crooks and hypocrites in the guise of legitimate businessmen and politicians, one could at least be honest with oneself, true to some personal code, and be an excellent thief. Luciano always said he needed nothing in writing because "his word was his bond." Luciano and the others had proved as street-gang kids that they had guts, courage, criminal skills, and a capacity for depersonalized violence, but they were also lucky. They arrived at adulthood just as the doors of criminal opportunity swung wide with Prohibition.

At the time of enactment of the legislation Lucky Luciano was twenty, Vito Genovese nineteen, Carlo Gambino seventeen, Al Capone eighteen, Thomas Lucchese eighteen, Joseph Profaci twenty, and Frank Costello twenty-six. By the time Prohibition went into effect, 16 January 1920, other street-gang teen-agers were coming of age to make themselves a name in organized crime: Meyer Lansky, seventeen, Pete Licavoli, sixteen, Jerry Catena, seventeen, Joe Adonis, seventeen, and Albert Anastasia, fifteen. By March 1933, when the legislation repealing Prohibition was enacted, these teen-agers had grown to manhood and had capital, organizational skills, and influence. Thus the serendipity of Prohibition provided opportunity, capital, and organization to routinize organized crime. Prohibition and personal choice, not career blockage or frustration with the legitimate mobility paths, moved these small-time hoodlums into leadership positions in organized crime.

Another aspect of our cultural system reinforces and further legitimizes and justifies the perverse world view of the organized criminal. This is the relationship between politics and the public, particularly the political party nominating and financing system that maintained the urban political machine.

As Ianni has succinctly put it,

The corrupt political structures of the major American cities and organized crime have always enjoyed a symbiotic relationship in which success in one is dependent on the right connections in the other.¹⁹

To understand how this symbiosis raises the organized criminal to a superior personal status above politicians, one must recognize that the corruptor always feels superior to the corruptee. The politician who accepts "favors" and in return provides protection to the illegal enterprises of organized crime not only gives a living witness to the criminal's world view but also confirms for the organized criminal, in violating his oath of office, that a criminal's code is superior to society's.

In a Chicago *Tribune* interview in 1927 Al Capone put it this way:

There is one thing that is worse than a crook and that's a crooked man in a big political job. A man who pretends he's enforcing the law and is really making dough out of somebody breaking it—a self-respecting hoodlum doesn't have any use for that kind of fellow—he buys them like he'd buy any other article necessary for his trade, but he hates them in his heart.²⁰

Here is one of America's leading organized criminals stating his moral code, indicating his superiority over crooked politicians and his belief in fundamental American values which he himself does not follow. Above all, clearly contained in this statement is a disdain for another's hypocrisy and a lack of recognition of his own.

With their own world view, their blinders, their moral code, organized criminals are of American society but only tangentially part of it. The organized criminal's concern is for wealth and the good things of life that wealth can provide. Many sociologists feel that respectability is really what the organized criminal is striving for. Bell, Ianni, and Tyler, all say this. These sociologists fail to realize that organized criminals are committed to their own moral code and world view and couldn't care less about respectability in mainstream terms. Respect and respectability in the larger society are unimportant because the organized criminal has rejected many if not most of the procedures on which mainstream values rest. Thus Daniel Bell is wrong when he implies that a desire for respectability led "the quondam racketeer" to provide "one of the major supports for a drive to win a political voice for Italians."²¹

Respectability was not what Costello, Lansky, and Luciano sought in political links to Al Smith, Franklin Roosevelt, Huey Long, Tammany leader James Hines, Mayor Jimmy Walker, and numerous judges and aldermen. They simply understood what Paul Kelly and Arnold Rothstein

had understood before them, and what organized criminals understand today, that it helps to have friends in high places. Nelli notes that at the 1932 Democratic Party Convention Costello shared a suite with James Hines, a Smith supporter. Lucky Luciano shared one with Albert Marinelli, leader of the Second Assembly District in New York and a Roosevelt supporter. This arrangement was not based on some "quondam racketeer's" desire for respectability; it was business.

Nelli puts it this way:

This sharing of quarters was of symbolic as well as practical significance for it demonstrated that criminal syndicate leaders from New York had achieved . . . power and influence equal to that of local party bosses.²²

Bell himself notes that Tammany Hall had to turn to Costello and Luciano for support and funds, yet he overlooks the evidence in the court trial of James Hines, the resignation of Albert Marinelli, as well as Costello's movement of slot machines to Huey Long's Louisiana, calling them attempts at respectability when they were simply business trade-offs. Sounding the same note, Bell states:

The early Italian gangsters were hoodlums—rough and unlettered and young (Al Capone was only twenty-nine at the height of his power). Those who survived learned to adapt. By now they are men of middle age or older. They learned to dress conservatively. Their homes are in respectable suburbs. They send their children to good schools and have sought to avoid publicity.²³

Of course organized criminals buy homes in respectable suburbs and send their children to good schools. Such actions are common to anyone of affluence in our society, criminal or college professor. That they dress conservatively and avoid publicity likewise tells us nothing about either respectability or having left organized crime. Such comments focus on the trappings and appearance of a noncriminal life-style; they show nothing of the substance.

The organized criminal operates by a different standard of values from that of the ordinary citizen seeking upward mobility and status within some dominant community. He seeks respect within his *borgata*, his "family," and not in that larger community which he mocks. Thus sociologists who point to the following as signs of mob desire for respectability can only be thought naive.

Many of the top "crime" figures long ago had forsworn violence, and even their income, in large part, was derived from legitimate investments . . . or from such quasi-legitimate but socially acceptable sources as gambling casinos.²⁴

The use of business "fronts" as laundries to wash illegally gained wealth and to create a basis for taxable income has been well documented.²⁵ The use of gambling casinos to skim millions of dollars in cash and as fronts for acts of corruption and blackmail is also well documented and is a common reason for organized crime's interest and hidden ownership in such enterprises.²⁶ Surely these facts suggest goals other than respectability.

What is American about American crime? Obviously, it is our values, their openness and pragmatism, our beliefs in competition, material success, individual action, freedom, and liberty. The openness of our values permits their reversal, which can be a very good and creative force, enhancing adaptability and change. As we have seen, it can also be a rather perverse one. Our values and the needs of our popular political institutions permit the creation of alternative ethical codes, and thus our values can be turned upside down.

Lucky Luciano, without fully being conscious of it, neatly captured both the possibilities and the paradox.

I had Masseria and Maranzano knocked off to get to the top. What I did was illegal; I broke the law. [Franklin] Roosevelt had us and other guys like Hines and Walker sent to the can or squashed. What he did was legal. But the pattern was exactly the same; we was both shitass doublecrossers, no matter how you look at it. Now, I don't say we elected Roosevelt, but we gave him a pretty good push. . . . I never knew that a guy who was gonna be President would stick a knife in your back when you wasn't looking. I never knew his word was no better than lots of rackets guys.²⁷

Poor Luciano. He expected mainstream values to be different from his own chosen world view. In that, he failed to realize just how much a product of the American system he was.

NOTES

1. See Leslie A. White, *The Science of Culture* (New York, 1970).
2. Gary Wills would agree on the values, but disagree with their Lockean roots. He gives Francis Hutcheson credit for influencing Jefferson's thought. The authors of the Constitution, and Jefferson was not among them, were more influenced by Locke. See Gary Wills, *Inventing America* (New York, 1978).
3. Common definitions of organized crime run the gamut from New York District Attorney Frank Hogan's—"Organized crime is two or more persons engaged in criminal activities"—to the more recent: Organized crime includes any group of individuals whose primary activity involves violating criminal laws to seek illegal profits and power by engaging in racketeering activities and, when appropriate, engaging in intricate financial manipulations. Whatever the definition, organized crime has been part of America since the first colonists realized how to take advantage of the Indians.
4. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2 (New York, 1967), p. 304.
5. James Truslow Adams, *Our Business Civilization* (New York, 1929), cited in Gus Tyler, *Organized Crime in America* (Ann Arbor, 1962), p. 44.

6. See Arthur Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present* (New York, 1949); Max Lerner, *America as a Civilization* (New York, 1957); Wayne Moquin, ed., *The American Way of Crime* (New York, 1976).

7. This is a futuristic novel in which organized crime has gained control of government and much of industry. Courtney Terret, *Only Saps Work* (New York, 1930). The view that only suckers work is less discussed today but a 1942 sociology textbook gives this view as a prime cause of organized crime. See the "Something for Nothing Philosophy" in Harry E. Barnes and Oreen M. Ruedi, *The American Way of Life* (New York, 1942, 1950), pp. 827-29.

8. Humbert Nelli, *The Business of Crime* (New York, 1976), p. 106.

9. Vincent Teresa, *My Life in the Mafia* (Greenwich, Conn., 1973), p. 73.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 111.

12. Martin A. Gosch and Richard Hammer, *The Last Testament of Lucky Luciano* (Boston, 1975), p. 37. This work was developed from interviews with Luciano in Italy a few years before his death.

13. Donald R. Cressey, *Theft of the Nation* (New York, 1969), pp. 177-78.

14. Nelli, *The Business of Crime*, p. 105.

15. Gosch and Hammer, *The Last Testament of Lucky Luciano*, p. 8.

16. Ibid., p. 16.

17. Nelli, *The Business of Crime*, p. 195.

18. Tyler, *Organized Crime in America*; Daniel Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," in *The End of Ideology*, ed. Daniel Bell (New York, 1960), pp. 127-50; Francis A. J. Ianni, *Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973); Idem, *A Family Business* (New York, 1972).

19. Francis A. J. Ianni, *The Black Mafia* (New York, 1974), p. 107.

20. Chicago *Tribune*, 6 December 1927; reprinted in *The American Way of Crime*, ed. Moquin, p. 69.

21. Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," p. 143.

22. Nelli, *The Business of Crime*, p. 195.

23. Bell "Crime as an American Way of Life," p. 147.

24. Ibid., p. 148.

25. See Melvin K. Bers, *The Penetration of Legitimate Business by Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1970); Jonathan Kwitny, *Vicious Circles: The Mafia in the Marketplace* (New York, 1979); Annelise G. Anderson, *The Business of Organized Crime* (Stanford, Calif., 1979).

26. See Ed Reid and Ovid Demaris, *The Green Felt Jungle* (New York, 1963); Teresa, *My Life in the Mafia*; Gosch and Hammer, *The Last Testament of Lucky Luciano*; Hank Messick, *Lansky*, (New York, 1974). Also 1,098 pages of affidavits of electronic surveillance of the Kansas City, Nick Civella, LCN family, June 1979 (author's personal copy).

27. Gosch and Hammer, *The Last Testament of Lucky Luciano*, p. 167.

Frontier Families: Crisis in Ideology

Lillian Schlissel

As Americans we have held particular affection for certain images in our national history. Frontier images provide a case in point. Barn raisings, sewing bees, corn husking, harvesting—all these reinforce a vision of the frontier tradition. We see this period of our past as an uncomplicated time of indomitable individualism and egalitarian exchanges between men. The frontier family was stable and strong and healthy. The pioneer father was resourceful; children learned independence virtually at their mother's breasts. Such images have held powerful sway. But when we undertake to reconstruct the actual texture of the frontier family, to examine the reality of its day-to-day existence, the simplicity of forms becomes less secure, the object before our eyes begins to shimmer with uncertainty.

I want to suggest that life on the frontier west of the Mississippi was not a time of simplicity; simplicity is only the reflection of our own need to locate our past, our national "childhood" within the secure realm of nostalgia. The men and women who settled the western frontier—the historical frontier, not the mythical frontier—were caught willy-nilly between currents of a premodern agricultural society and a society of technology and modernism. Diaries, journals, and family papers tell of the tensions that surrounded ideological ambiguity.

The frontier west of the Mississippi between 1850 and 1880 existed at the confluence of powerful and complex forces. Railroads quickly crossed these regions. Newsprint and telegraphy brought cosmopolitan values and expectations. Cities like San Francisco, Denver, St. Joseph, and Kansas City sprang up virtually in advance of the frontier. The settlers of the West were farmers, but they were also town builders, planners, and speculators. The men and women who made the overland crossing, almost a quarter of a million of them between 1850 and 1860, were what we might call farmer-entrepreneurs. Factory workers and wage laborers of the eastern cities could rarely save enough money to make the transconti-

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